위키리크스에서 이번에 공개한 한반도 관련 비밀문서들, 미국무부나 주한미대사관에서 생산한
문서들이라지만 아직 미국 내에서는 자료의 신뢰도나 진짜 여부에 대해서 가타부타 긍정도
부정도 안 하고 있는 상태. 한반도를 둘러싼 국제정세에 대한 '미국의 시각' 혹은 '해석',
혹은 '의지'를 읽을 수 있는 자료들인 거 같아 통째로 긁어와 버렸다. 총 12개의 비밀문서 원본.
http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/KS_0.html
나중에 시간나면 좀더 들여다보고 중요하다 싶은 부분 밑줄 쳐볼 생각.
* * *
1. Viewing cable 10STATE16932, S) EFFORTS BY IRAN,S SBIG TO PROCURE CARBON
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10STATE16932 2010-02-24 15:03 2010-11-28 18:06 SECRET Secretary of State
VZCZCXYZ0013
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TO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 3151
INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE PRIORITYS E C R E T STATE 016932
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2035
TAGS: MTCRE PARM PREL MNUC ETTC KSCA IR CH KS
SUBJECT: (S) EFFORTS BY IRAN,S SBIG TO PROCURE CARBON
FIBER FROM A COMPANY IN CHINA
Classified By: (U) CLASSIFIED BY EAP DAS DAVID SHEAR,
REASON: 1.4 (C).
1. (U) This is an action request. Embassy Beijing, please see paragraph 3.
2. (S) Background/Objective: The United States has information that in December 2009, an Iranian company was seeking to procure five tons of carbon fiber from Yoon Networks Shanghai Company. We understand this company is likely seeking this material on behalf of the Shahid Bakeri Industries Group (SBIG), which is responsible for Iran's solid propellant ballistic missile program and an entity esignated under United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1737. The fiber being sought by the Iranian company may be controlled by the Wassenaar Arrangement and Nuclear Suppliers Group and could be used to produce rocket nozzles or motor cases for Iran's solid propellant ballistic missile systems. We want to share this information with Chinese officials and request that they take measures to prevent this material from being transferred from China to Iran's missile program. We also want to note that we believe taking such action would be consistent with UNSCR 1737.
3. (S) Action Request: Request Embassy Beijing approach appropriate host government officials to deliver talking points/non-paper in paragraph 4 below and report response. Talking points also may be provided as a non-paper.
4. (S) Begin talking points/non-paper:
(SECRET//REL CHINA)
--We would like to alert you to information of proliferation concern and request your assistance in investigating this activity.
--The United States has information that in December 2009, an Iranian company was seeking to procure five tons of carbon fiber from Yoon Networks Shanghai Company, a China-based firm operated by a South Korean individual.
--We understand this company is likely seeking this material on behalf of the Shahid Bakeri Industries Group (SBIG), which is responsible for Iran's solid propellant ballistic missile program and an entity designated under United Nations
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1737.
--The fiber being sought by the Iranian company may be controlled by the Wassenaar Arrangement and Nuclear Suppliers Group and could be used by Iran to produce rocket nozzles for its solid propellant medium-range and short-range ballistic missile systems. It also could be used by SBIG to produce lighter motor cases that could potentially extend the range of these systems.
--We believe that the transfer of this material to SBIG poses a significant missile proliferation risk and is inconsistent with UNSCR 1737.
--We therefore urge you to investigate this activity and take measures to prevent this material from being transferred from China to Iran's missile program.
--We look forward to continued cooperation on missile nonproliferation issues and to hearing of any actions your government takes in response to this information.
End talking points/non-paper
5. (U) Washington POC is ISN/MTR James Mayes (Phone: 202-647-3185). Please slug any reporting on this issue for ISN/MTR and EAP/CM.
6. (U) A word version of this document will be posted at www.state.sgov.gov/demarche.
CLINTON
2. Viewing cable 10SEOUL272, VFM CHUN YOUNG-WOO ON SINO-NORTH KOREAN RELATIONS
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10SEOUL272 2010-02-22 09:09 2010-11-29 21:09 SECRET Embassy Seoul
Appears in these articles: nytimes.com
VZCZCXYZ0000
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7125
INFO RUCNKOR/KOREA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 7305
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 7377 S E C R E T SEOUL 000272
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/22/2034
TAGS PREL, PGOV, KNNP, ECON, SOCI, KS, KN, JA, CH
SUBJECT: VFM CHUN YOUNG-WOO ON SINO-NORTH KOREAN RELATIONS
Classified By: AMB D. Kathleen Stephens. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
Summary
-------
1. (S) Vice Foreign Minister Chun Yung-woo told the Ambassador February 17th that China would not be able to stop North Korea’s collapse following the death of Kim Jong-il (KJI). The DPRK, Chun said, had already collapsed economically and would collapse politically two to three years after the death of Kim Jong-il. Chun dismissed ROK media reports that Chinese companies had agreed to pump 10 billion USD into the North’s economy. Beijing had “no will” to use its modest economic leverage to force a change in Pyongyang’s policies -- and the DPRK characterized as “the most incompetent official in China” -- had retained his position as chief of the PRC’s 6PT delegation. Describing a generational difference in Chinese attitudes toward North Korea, Chun claimed XXXXXXXXXXXX believed Korea should be unified under ROK control. Chun acknowledged the Ambassador’s point that a strong ROK-Japan relationship would help Tokyo accept a reunified Korean Peninsula. End summary.
VFM Chun on Sino-North Korean Relations...
------------------------------------------
2. (S) During a February 17 lunch hosted by Ambassador Stephens that covered other topics (septel), ROK Vice Foreign Minister and former ROK Six-Party Talks (6PT) Head of Delegation Chun Yung-woo predicted that China would not be able to stop North Korea’s collapse following the death of Kim Jong-il (KJI). The DPRK, Chun said, had already collapsed economically; following the death of KJI, North Korea would collapse politically in “two to three years.” Chun dismissed ROK media reports that Chinese companies had agreed to pump 10 billion USD into the North’s economy; there was “no substance” to the reports, he said. The VFM also ridiculed the Chinese foreign ministry’s “briefing” to the ROK embassy in Beijing on Wang Jiarui’s visit to North Korea; the unidentified briefer had “basically read a Xinhua press release,” Chun groused, adding that the PRC interlocutor had been unwilling to answer simple questions like whether Wang had flown to Hamhung or taken a train there to meet KJI.
3. (S) The VFM commented that China had far less influence on North Korea “than most people believe.” Beijing had “no will” to use its economic leverage to force a change in Pyongyang’s policies and the DPRK leadership “knows it.” Chun acknowledged that the Chinese genuinely wanted a denuclearized North Korea, but the PRC was also content with the status quo. Unless China pushed North Korea to the “brink of collapse,” the DPRK would likely continue to refuse to take meaningful steps on denuclearization.
XXXXXXXXXXXX
-----------------------------------------
4. (S) Turning to the Six Party Talks, Chun said it was “a very bad thing” that Wu Dawei had retained his position as chief of the PRC’s delegation. XXXXXXXXXXXX said it appeared that the DPRK “must have lobbied extremely hard” for the now-retired Wu to stay on as China’s 6PT chief. [NAME REMOVED] complained that Wu is the PRC’s XXXXXXXXXXXX an arrogant, Marx-spouting former Red Guard who “knows nothing about North Korea, nothing about nonproliferation and is hard to communicate with because he doesn’t speak English.” Wu was also a hardline nationalist, loudly proclaiming -- to anyone willing to listen -- that the PRC’s economic rise represented a “return to normalcy” with China as a great world power.
...China’s “New Generation” of Korea-Hands...
---------------------------------------------
5. (S) Sophisticated Chinese officials XXXXXXXXXXXX stood in sharp contrast to Wu, according to VFM Chun.XXXXXXXXXXXX Chun claimed XXXXXXXXXX believed Korea should be unified under ROK control.XXXXXXXXXXXX, Chun said, were ready to “face the new reality” that the DPRK now had little value to China as a buffer state -- a view that since North Korea’s 2006 nuclear test had reportedly gained traction among senior PRC leaders.
...PRC Actions In A DPRK Collapse Scenario...
---------------------------------------------
6. (S) Chun argued that, in the event of a North Korean collapse, China would clearly “not welcome” any U.S. military presence north of the DMZ. XXXXXXXXXXXX Chun XXXXXXXXXXXX said the PRC would be comfortable with a reunified Korea controlled by Seoul and anchored to the United States in a “benign alliance” -- as long as Korea was not hostile towards China. Tremendous trade and labor-export opportunities for Chinese companies, Chun said, would also help salve PRC concerns about living with a reunified Korea. Chundismissed the prospect of a possible PRC military intervention in the event of a DPRK collapse, noting that China’s strategic economic interests now lie with the United States, Japan, and South Korea -- not North Korea. Moreover, Chun argued, bare-knuckle PRC military intervention in a DPRK internal crisis could “strengthen the centrifugal forces in China’s minority areas.”
...and Japan
------------
7. (S) Chun acknowledged the Ambassador’s point that a strong ROK-Japan relationship would help Tokyo accept a reunified Korean Peninsula under Seoul’s control. Chun asserted that, even though “Japan’s preference” was to keep Korea divided, Tokyo lacked the leverage to stop reunification in the event the DPRK collapses. STEPHENS
3. Viewing cable 10SEOUL290, A/S CAMPBELL’S FEBRUARY 3 MEETING WITH NSA
KIMReference ID Created Released Classification Origin 10SEOUL290 2010-02-22 08:08 2010-11-29 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Seoul VZCZCXYZ0001
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INFO RUCNKOR/KOREA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUACAAA/COMUSKOREA INTEL SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSFK SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
Monday, 22 February 2010, 08:54
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000290
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/23/2030
TAGS PREL, PGOV, SOCI, MARR, ECON, ETRD, KN, KS, CH
SUBJECT: A/S CAMPBELL’S FEBRUARY 3 MEETING WITH NSA KIM
Classified By: Ambassador D. Kathleen Stephens. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
Summary
-------
1. (C) During a February 3 meeting, National Security Adviser Kim Sung-hwan told EAP Assistant Secretary Campbell the ROKG wished to have discussions with Washington about delaying the planned transfer of wartime operation control to Korea. Kim agreed that turbulence in Sino-American relations meant Beijing would be hesitant to call a new round of the Six Party Talks. It was encouraging, however, that veteran DPRK negotiator Kim Gye-gwan was slated to visit Beijing next week. NSA Kim asserted that Kim Jong-il needed to visit China soon in order to get more economic assistance, as the DPRK’s internal situation appeared to be significantly more unstable. NSA Kim acknowledged it was important to reach out directly to key DPJ officials like Foreign Minister Okada and Finance Minister Kan. The North Koreans, Kim said, were clearly using several different channels to “knock on the DPJ’s door.” President Lee may visit a Korean factory in the United States to help sell KORUS to the American public. Kim suggested that President Obama and President Lee pay a joint visit to the Korean War Memorial in Washington to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the Korean War. Campbell asked for ROK understanding for U.S. plans to resume MIA remains recovery operations in North Korea. Kim emphasized that President Lee would never “buy” a summit with Pyongyang. End summary.
OPCON Transfer
--------------
2. (C) During a February 3 meeting with Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell, ROK National Security Adviser Kim Sung-hwan said he wished to have discussions with the USG on the planned April 2012 transfer of wartime operation control (OPCON) to Korea. Kim agreed with Campbell’s observation that it was important for the Korean public to understand that any change that may be considered concerning OPCON transfer timing, and the U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review, would not diminish America’s commitment to the ROK’s security, and should not be so interpreted. China Unlikely to Call New 6PT Round
------------------------------------
3. (C) NSA Kim agreed with Campbell’s observation that the current turbulence in Sino-American relations meant Beijing would be hesitant to call a new round of the Six Party Talks (6PT) anytime soon. Referring to POTUS’ upcoming meeting with the Dalai Lama, Kim said the Chinese were “far too sensitive” about the Tibetan spiritual leader’s meetings with foreign officials. A few years ago, Kim related, the PRC had crudely pressured the ROK government into canceling a planned speech by the Dalai Lama at a Buddhist conference on Cheju Island.
4. (C) NSA Kim said he was encouraged by reports that veteran DPRK negotiator Kim Gye-gwan was slated to visit Beijing next week at the invitation of Chinese 6PT chief Wu Dawei. NSA Kim said he understood Kim Gye-gwan might also visit New York. Campbell noted it was important for the DPRK authorities to hear from the Five Parties that Pyongyang’s attempt to shift the focus from denuclearization to a peace treaty was not working.
KJI China Trip and Deteriorating Conditions Inside DPRK
--------------------------------------------- -----------
5. (C) NSA Kim asserted that North Korean leader Kim Jong-il needed to visit China soon in order to get more economic assistance. The PRC was in the process of delivering a portion of the food aid promised during Premier Wen’s visit to the DPRK last fall; approximately 6,000 metric tons (MT) of rice and 20,000 MT of soybeans has been delivered, but the DPRK needed a lot more. The situation inside North Korea, he added, appeared increasingly unstable. The North’s currency replacement had created strong resentment throughout DPRK society, Kim said, adding that DPRK Finance Chief Pak Nam-gi had apparently been sacked. Kim asserted there were credible reports of unrest in the North; according to ROK intelligence sources, DPRK police recently found a bomb on a passenger train en route from Pyongyang to Beijing.
U.S.-Japan Relations
--------------------
6. (C) Kim concurred with Campbell’s assessment that the DPJ
was “completely different” from the LDP and agreed it was important for the DJP to coordinate with Seoul and Washington as it made preliminary overtures to Pyongyang. The North Koreans, Kim said, were clearly using several different channels to “knock on the DPJ’s door.” Kim acknowledged Campbell’s point that it was important to reach out directly to key DPJ officials like Foreign Minister Okada and Finance Minister Naoto Kan.
FTA Prospects
-------------
7. (C) It was the ROK government’s view, Kim said, that there might be a window of opportunity to pass KORUS immediately after the U.S. Congressional elections this fall. Kim added that the ROK Embassy in Washington was working on a possible FTA event for President Lee during his upcoming trip to the United States for the nuclear summit. One idea, Kim explained, was to have President Lee visit a Korean factory to help underscore to the American public that the FTA was about creating jobs in America as well in Korea. Campbell praised ROK Ambassador Han Duck-soo for his public outreach on KORUS and noted that the U.S. business community needed to “stop being lazy” and help get KORUS through Congress.
Korean War Memorial Visit
-------------------------
8. (C) NSA Kim asked if, during the April nuclear summit in Washington, it would be possible to have POTUS and President Lee pay a joint visit to the Korean War Memorial. Campbell acknowledged the powerful symbolism for both the Korean and American audience of such a visit during the 60th anniversary of the Korean War, but cautioned that it would be extremely difficult to arrange during the nuclear summit.
MIA Remains Recovery in North Korea
-----------------------------------
9. (C) Campbell asked for ROK understanding about the U.S. position on resuming MIA remains recovery operations in North Korea. The USG felt strongly, Campbell explained, that this was an important humanitarian issue. Campbell stressed that the U.S. would coordinate closely with the ROK on the issue to “avoid sending the wrong signal” to the DPRK. Pressed by Kim about paying the North Koreans cash to help recover U.S. remains, Campbell agreed it was distasteful; he noted, however, that the United States had made similar payments to the Burmese and Vietnamese governments to facilitate cooperation on MIA issues.
Prospects for a North-South Summit
----------------------------------
10. (C) On prospects for a North-South summit, NSA Kim clarified remarks that President Lee made in an interview with the BBC in Davos. Kim said that, beginning last fall, the ROK has had contact with the DPRK about a summit. The North, however, has demanded that Seoul provide a certain amount of economic aid prior to any summit. That precondition was unacceptable, Kim stressed, noting that the Blue House had emphasized to the ROK press this week that President Lee would never “buy” a summit with the North. STEPHENS
4. Viewing cable 10SEOUL248, A/S CAMPBELL DISCUSSES DPRK FUTURE WITH
EXPERTSReference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10SEOUL248 2010-02-18 04:04 2010-11-29 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Seoul
Appears in these articles:
nytimes.com
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INFO RUCNKOR/KOREA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 7291
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 7364
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC PRIORITY
RUACAAA/COMUSKOREA INTEL SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
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RHMFISS/COMUSFK SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000248
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/18/2035
TAGS PREL, PHUM, PGOV, SOCI, KN, KS, CH
SUBJECT: A/S CAMPBELL DISCUSSES DPRK FUTURE WITH EXPERTS
Classified By: AMB D. Kathleen Stephens. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
SUMMARY
-------
1. (C) A group of five ROK opinion leaders and experts on North Korea issues told A/S Kurt Campbell on February 3 it was difficult to predict whether Kim Jong-il’s youngest son Kim Jong-un would be able to succeed his father without sparking instability in the North. Of the five experts, one thought the younger Kim might succeed and one argued his lack of leadership experience made it unlikely he would win the support of the ruling elites. They agreed that Kim Jong-il’s brother-in-law Jang Song-taek would prove a strong rival for the younger Kim and would probably be tempted to challenge him. Kim Jong-il had used draconian controls and international aid to discourage coups after having foiled three such attempts in the late 90s. China’s strategic interests were fundamentally at odds with U.S.-ROK interests in North Korea. End Summary. Succession in Progress but Success in Doubt
-------------------------------------------
2. (C) Assistant Secretary Kurt Campbell met on February 3 with Korean opinion leaders with a keen interest in DPRK issues to hear their views on the future of North Korea. The experts agreed that regime succession was fully underway and that the North Korean people had accepted the process. XXXXXXXXXXX said a North Korean diplomat based in Beijing had told him over the phone that morning that the DPRK Foreign Ministry had instructed all of its overseas missions to “lay the foundation for leadership change in Pyongyang.” Most of the experts believed the challenge for Kim Jong-il’s youngest son and designated heir, Kim Jong-un, would most likely come after his father died. XXXXXXXXXXX recalled the Chosun Dynasty’s 500 year history in which political intrigue and tension might simmer for years, but tended to erupt only after the king died. 3. (C) The group agreed that Kim Jong-il’s brother-in-law and right-hand man Jang Song-taek was spearheading the succession drive and would be a rival for power once Kim Jong-un’s father died, but the group was split on the younger Kim’s prospects for holding onto power. XXXXXXXXXXX believed it would be difficult for Jang to wrest power from the younger Kim once the succession process was complete. XXXXXXXXXXX suggested it was unclear whether Jang would be content to control the younger Kim from behind the curtain, or would challenge him directly for outright control. XXXXXXXXXXX
Doubts About Younger Kim’s Experience
-------------------------------------
4. (C) There were many reasons to doubt that Kim Jong-un would be able to successfully fend off challenges to his control after his father died. XXXXXXXXXXX noted that Kim Jong-il had twenty years of experience as an official of the Korean Workers’ Party before his father died. Furthermore, Kim Jong-il had the benefit of years of guidance from his father after he had been officially anointed in 1980 to eventually succeed him. By contrast, Kim Jong-un had very limited experience and might not get much direct guidance before Kim Jong-il dies. Even now, XXXXXXXXXXX it was not clear that Kim Jong-il’s health was good enough to exercise the faculties necessary for day-to-day management of state affairs. Given the limited opportunity the younger Kim had to gain experience, XXXXXXXXXXX doubted his ability to solidify his position in the Party and win the unwavering support of Pyongyang’s power elites. XXXXXXXXXXX recalled the tumultuous state of affairs in the ROK following the death of President Park Chung Hee in 1979 and suggested the DPRK succession would be “100 times more troublesome.” XXXXXXXXXXX
Tight Control and Aid Kept Regime Afloat
----------------------------------------
5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXX opined that brutal repression and international aid had been the secrets of Kim Jong-il’s ability to fend off challenges. After three separate coup attempts in the 90s, Kim Jong-il had implemented very strict controls and sent a stern warning to would-be plotters by executing anyone who had been even remotely involved in the plots. Therefore, only the military could even dare consider rising up, but the Security Services had successfully kept the military in check. XXXXXXXXXXXwent on to suggest that the “indulgence” of the international community over the past ten years had also helped sustain the regime. The large-scale assistance provided to the regime by the ROK, China, the U.S., Japan and others had been intended in part to avoid a hard landing, and indeed had kept the regime afloat, he said. [Name removed] suggested that North Korea had skillfully played Washington and Beijing off one another.XXXXXXXXXXX believed that the DPRK had exploited large amounts of assistance from China, taking advantage of a situation in which Beijing was presumed by Washington to have significant influence over Pyongyang. China
Complicates the Endgame
-----------------------------
6. (C) The experts agreed that China’s obsession with DPRK stability at all costs, was clearly and fundamentally at odds with U.S. and ROK interests. Given a choice between reaching out to Seoul or Beijing, [name removed] believed that Pyongyang elites would reflexively look to China for support if they believed they needed help in maintaining stability. The Seoul option would be unacceptable because of the U.S.-ROK alliance and concerns over becoming subservient to Seoul. China, on the other hand, would gladly provide support with few or no strings attached, just to maintain the DPRK as an independent entity, XXXXXXXXXXX maintained.
7. (C)XXXXXXXXXXXnoted that although Washington had a keen interest in both denuclearization and human rights, the U.S. stake in North Korea was minimal compared to that of China by virtue of its proximity to the North. China did not share American perspectives on these two key issues, considering them somewhat abstract. Rather, Beijing was concerned about what it considered to be more concrete issues, such as a potential flood of “economic migrants” and broader social unrest on its immediate border. Reaching the People and Close
Cooperation are Key
--------------------------------------------- ----
8. (C) Negating Chinese influence over the long term, [Name removed] observed, would involve close U.S.-ROK cooperation in winning the hearts and minds of the North Korean people. XXXXXXXXXXX STEPHENS
5. Viewing cable 10SEOUL62, SPECIAL ENVOY KING’S 1/11 MEETING WITH FM YU
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin 10SEOUL62 2010-01-14 09:09 2010-11-29 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Seoul Appears in these articles:nytimes.com VZCZCXYZ0001
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RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSFK SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY Thursday, 14 January 2010, 09:40
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000062
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/14/2030
TAGS PHUM, PREL, PGOV, PINR, SOCI, ECON, KN, KS, CH
SUBJECT: SPECIAL ENVOY KING’S 1/11 MEETING WITH FM YU
Classified By: Ambassador D. Kathleen Stephens. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
Summary
-------
1. (C) During a January 11 meeting with Special Envoy Robert King, FM Yu downplayed press speculation that a North-South summit is imminent. Yu asserted that Kim Jong-il (KJI) would visit China in late January or early February; the North Korean leader needed both Chinese economic aid and political support to stabilize an “increasingly chaotic” situation at home. An unspecified number of high-ranking North Korean officials had recently defected to the ROK, according to Yu. The foreign minister thanked King for his willingness to press the PRC on the treatment of North Korean refugees. Yu said the ROK would provide “significant” food aid to the DPRK if Pyongyang asked for it and agreed to monitoring. The ROK also planned to help fund work by NGOs to combat TB and multi-drug-resistant TB in the North, which has spread widely within the DPRK’s chronically malnourished population. At a lunch following the meeting, Seoul’s point man on DPRK issues, Ambassador Wi Sung-lac, reiterated the FM’s call for U.S. help in persuading China to go easier on North Korean refugees. Wi also thanked Ambassador King for his willingness to keep the ROK updated on discussions between the American Red Cross and its DPRK counterpart regarding potential reunions between Korean-Americans and their North Korean kin. End summary.
FM Yu on: Prospects for North-South Summit...
--------------------------------------------- -
2. (C) During a January 11 meeting with Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights Issues Robert King, Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan downplayed press speculation that a North-South summit is imminent. The ROK was discussing the issue with the DPRK, Yu said, noting that there were two major Blue House preconditions: the nuclear issue had to be on the agenda and the ROK would not pay the North to hold a summit. Yu speculated that it would “take some time” for the North Koreans to “digest” the preconditions.
...Rumors of a KJI Visit to China...
------------------------------------
3. (C) Yu asserted that Kim Jong-il (KJI) would visit China in late January or early February. The North Korean leader had visited the PRC twice before in that timeframe, Yu related, adding that KJI needed both Chinese economic aid and political support to stabilize an “increasingly chaotic” situation at home. In particular, FM Yu claimed that the North’s botched currency reform had caused “big problems” for the regime and that the power succession from KJI to Kim Jong-eun was “not going smoothly.” Moreover, Yu confided, an unspecified number of high-ranking North Korean officials working overseas had recently defected to the ROK. (Note: Yu emphasized that the defections have not been made public. End note.)
...Pressuring Beijing on Refugees...
------------------------------------
4. (C) Yu thanked Ambassador King for stating that he intended to work closely with the ROK on the issue of improving human rights conditions in North Korea. Yu also expressed appreciation for Ambassador King’s willingness to engage the Chinese on the issue of North Korean refugees. Yu said he has repeatedly raised the matter with PRC FM Yang, only to get a boilerplate response emphasizing that North Koreans in China are economic migrants. Yu claimed that the number of North Koreans fleeing into China XXXXXXXXXXXX continues to increase; 2,952 North Koreans made it to the ROK in 2009 and more than that are expected in 2010. Yu noted that at least 80 percent of the refugees who come to the South are women, adding that they are often abused by human traffickers. XXXXXXXXXXXX Yu added that he was skeptical that the DPRK would engage in dialogue with the EU about human rights.
...and Humanitarian Assistance to the North
-------------------------------------------
5. (C) Responding to a question from Ambassador King, Yu said the North Korean grain harvest was approximately 4 million metric tons (MMT), which was better than expected but still short of the 4.5 MMT the regime needs to ensure stability. (Note: The official ROKG estimate is that the DPRK harvest was approximately 5 MMT. End note.) Given the North’s chronic transportation and storage problems, there would be starvation “here and there” during the spring, Yu lamented. The foreign minister said the ROK would be willing to provide “significant” food aid to the DPRK if Pyongyang asked for it and agreed to monitoring. The ROK would not, Yu said, simply give the North a huge amount of grain. Any aid would be given in small amounts, he stressed. The foreign minister also said the ROK would help fund work by NGOs to combat multi-drug-resistant TB in the North, which has spread widely within the DPRK’s chronically malnourished population.
Follow-On Lunch with XXXXXXXXXXXX
--------------------------------
6. (C) At a lunch following the meeting with XXXXXXXXXX reiterated the FM’s call for the United States to XXXXXXXXXXXX
7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX thanked Ambassador King for his willingness to keep the ROK updated on discussions between the American Red Cross and its DPRK counterpart regarding potential reunions between Korean-Americans and their relatives in North Korea. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that North Korea has made only token efforts to support North-South family reunions and has “reacted badly” to Seoul’s repeated calls for the release of the approximately 1,000 abductees and POWs believed to be still held by the DPRK. XXXXXXXXXXXX stressed that Seoul appreciated Ambassador King’s effort to keep the family reunion, abductee, and POW issues on the proverbial agenda. STEPHENS
6. Viewing cable 09SEOUL1241, SCENESETTER FOR CODEL BERMAN'S VISIT TO
KOREAReference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09SEOUL1241 2009-08-06 06:06 2010-11-29 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Seoul
Appears in these articles:
nytimes.com
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHUL #1241/01 2180645
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 060645Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5228
INFO RUCNKOR/KOREA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSFK SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA CC SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RUACAAA/COMUSKOREA INTEL SEOUL KOR PRIORITYC O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001241
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KS KN
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL BERMAN'S VISIT TO KOREA
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Mark A. Tokola.
Reasons 1.4 (b), (d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: CODEL Berman, welcome to Korea. The alliance between the U.S. and the Republic of Korea (ROK) is strong, enduring, and strategically important. Your visit follows the successful June 16 U.S.-ROK Presidential Summit and adoption of the Joint Vision Statement. The Joint Vision Statement was well-received here, both for its recommitment to a continued strengthening of our security relationship (including its affirmation of the U.S. nuclear umbrella and extended deterrence to the ROK), and for outlining what a 21st century U.S.-ROK relationship entails. To realize this vision, we will need to continue to expand our cooperation, both regionally and globally. Security in the region, particularly in view of North Korea,s continued belligerent posture and Kim Jong-Il,s declining health, is important to Korean officials. Like us, the ROK supports the Six Party Talks and remains adamant that we should not recognize North Korea as a nuclear state. Your South Korean interlocutors are very interested in how you view the proposed North Korean contingency plan, and prospects for denuclearizing North Korea.
2. (C) President Lee has faced criticism from his opponents or his inability to generate momentum for the Korea-U.S. (KORUS) FTA in Washington. Ratification of the FTA is seen as a sign of America's strategic commitment in northeast Asia. President Obama's statement at the April G20 meeting with Lee, that the U.S. wanted to find a way forward on the KORUS FTA, allayed some of the anxiety in Seoul, and enabled Lee to push the FTA through the committee of jurisdiction in Korea,s National Assembly in late April. A full plenary vote in the National Assembly has not been scheduled; while opponents are vocal, the KORUS FTA continues to receive about a 60 percent approval Korean public opinion polls, is strongly supported by the majority GNP party, and is expected to pass once there is some sign of movement in Washington. The Obama Administration is conducting a thorough review of the KORUS FTA and consulting closely with all stakeholders to understand the exact nature of their concerns, and to develop recommendations for addressing them. To assist with this review, and to ensure that all who may have an interest in this free trade agreement are able to fully express their views, we issued a Federal Register Notice on July 27, 2009, requesting comments on the KORUS FTA. End Summary.
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BACKGROUND
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3. (C) The ROK, with its vibrant democracy, free market, high-tech economy, highly educated population, free press, and ever-deepening people-to-people ties with the United States, is a striking success story, including for U.S. foreign policy. Our intensive engagement with the ROK since its founding in 1948 exemplifies the importance of all three pillars Secretary Clinton has outlined describing U.S. foreign policy: defense, diplomacy, and development. South Korea's success is based on a shared commitment to defense, as shown by the 28,500 U.S. troops still on the Peninsula, the substantial development assistance the U.S. provided after the Korean War, and our close diplomatic cooperation to achieve a denuclearized North Korea and a more secure and prosperous future for the region.
4. (C) Now a developed country with a tested democratic system, South Korea increasingly has the capability as well as the political will to assume larger regional and global roles. Your visit will encourage your interlocutors to become even more active partners with us on issues ranging from human rights promotion to climate change to sea piracy to counter-terrorism. We share values and strategic goals with this highly capable ally; we need to give substance to our shared aspiration to upgrade our bilateral relationship, making it a global partnership.
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The Domestic Situation
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5. (C) President Lee, of the center-right Grand National Party (GNP), began his single five-year term in February 2008, ending ten years of center-left control of the Presidency. In April 2008 the GNP won a solid majority over the main opposition Democratic Party (DP) in the unicameral National Assembly. The GNP's success at the polls, however, belied the lack of consensus among the South Korean public on domestic political issues like media law reform, labor relations, tax policy, and education. President Lee has struggled with low approval ratings -- about 30 percent --since taking office, especially following his decision to re-open the Korean market to U.S. beef last year. In the National Assembly, the GNP and DP have even lower approval ratings than President Lee, resulting in a virtually deadlocked domestic agenda.
6. (C) President Lee has remained publicly disengaged from the squabbling in the National Assembly and is focusing instead on foreign policy, resource diplomacy, and international cooperative efforts on green growth, climate change, and overcoming the economic crisis. He campaigned on a pledge to strengthen the U.S.-ROK alliance, and is widely seen as having been successful. With China and Russia, he has substantially expanded the ROK's economic and political ties. He has attempted to overcome historical animosities with Japan to advance Korea-Japan ties based on Korea's pragmatic interests, but sensitivities to Japan's colonization of Korea run deep. Looking wider, President Lee is actively cultivating new ties with Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and Europe.
7. (C) Former President Kim Dae-jung's health has been failing and he is currently hospitalized in Seoul in intensive care. The prognosis for President Kim, who was in office 1998-2003 and who is 84, is not good.
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The Alliance
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8. (C) For over half a century the U.S.-ROK alliance has provided the foundation for peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia. The ROK has benefitted greatly; neither the economic "Miracle on the Han" nor Korea,s democratic flowering would have been possible absent a U.S. defense shield and economic assistance and support. The U.S. too has benefited. USFK (U.S. Forces in Korea) is our only troop presence in mainland East Asia, and South Korea contributes billions of dollars to USFK operating expenses.
9. (C) The Summit Joint Vision Statement offers a compelling vision of expanding the role of the U.S.-ROK alliance regionally and globally. On the Korean Peninsula, we are also working to strengthen, further broaden, and appropriately evolve the security relationship by implementing three key bilateral transformation agreements known as YRP, LPP and STP.
-- YRP: The Yongsan Relocation Plan will relocate the headquarters of U.S. Forces (USFK) from the middle of Seoul to a new, purpose-built war-fighting headquarters south of the city, thereby giving back to the Koreans a large tract of land historically associated with Japanese occupation which they plan to turn into a central park. Progress on the implementation of YRP continues but construction to prepare U.S. Army Garrison ) Humphreys, the hub for the relocation, continues on schedule but faces obstacles that require President Lee,s and his administration,s support if we are to meet the agreed 2014 completion date.
-- LPP: The Land Partnership Plan will consolidate over 100 U.S. military bases spread all across Korea into two key strategic hubs south of the Han River, replacing an outdated military footprint from the end of the Korean War with a modern and better-positioned force posture. The ROK Ministry of National Defense (MND) seeks to complete the LPP by the end of 2015.
-- STP: The Strategic Transition Plan is the process under which we are transferring wartime operational control (OPCON) of South Korean forces from the U.S. military to the ROK military by April 17, 2012. President Lee has emphasized the need to keep the spotlight off of wartime OPCON transition due to increased scrutiny by ROK domestic opposition groups regarding the April 17, 2012 transition date (in the wake of North Korea,s recent claimed nuclear test). We are continuing to emphasize the process for close cooperation in reviewing OPCON transition progress through the SCM and management of messaging and public perceptions to highlight the value of the restructuring.
10. (C) We must continue to emphasize the importance of completing the two relocation elements of USFK transformation, YRP and LPP. Those agreements, signed in 2004, did not come with appropriated funds. The Master Plan, finished in 2007, lays out the cost and timeline but the ROKG has yet to request funding from the National Assembly. Other U.S. and ROK private sector initiatives are failing to fill the funding gap. As a result, alliance transformation, whichwas originally scheduled for completion in 2008, is facing a delay of many more years. To avoid further delays, the ROKG must make implementation of these moves a priority. For our part, we must be clear and consistent in identifying our own top priorities .
11. (C). The time is right to expand the areas in which the U.S. and the ROK cooperate on global security issues. You may want to raise the following areas where the ROK may be ready to increase its global security role:
-- Afghanistan: The ROKG is planning to provide more assistance and training in Afghanistan, including building a new hospital and a training center in Bagram, and contributing ambulances, motorcycles, and police trainers. However, we need a lot more from the ROK, especially financial support for the Afghan Army, for which we have requested USD 100 million a year for five years, which is the USG primary request of the ROK. The ROKG also is considering sending a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) to Afghanistan, which we would welcome, but we also have insisted that any such PRT include a military unit to provide for its own security. Such a deployment (the PRT as well as any other military assets, such as an ISR unit ) intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) will need National Assembly approval, which will pose difficult, but not insurmountable, political problems for President Lee.
-- UN Peacekeeping Operations: The National Assembly is deliberating on a bill that will allow the ROK military to be deployed for peacekeeping missions without prior legislative approval. In the meantime, the National Assembly in July approved extending the ROK,s PKO deployment in Lebanon until the end of December 2010. The ROK has contributed 367 soldiers for peacekeeping in Lebanon since 2007 and is participating in eight other PKO operations around the world. As of January 1, 2008 the ROK was the 10th largest provider of assessed contributions to the UN PKO budget.
-- Combating Piracy off Somalia: The ROK is a member of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. Additionally, the ROKG deployed a 4,500 ton class destroyer equipped with a Lynx helicopter and rigid inflatable craft to the Gulf of Aden to be part of the maritime security operations of the combined maritime forces. The destroyer carries up to 310 personnel.
-- Proliferation Security Initiative: In response to the DPRK,s May rocket launch and nuclear test, the ROK on May 26 joined the U.S.-initiated Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). In June the ROK participated in a PSI meeting in Poland, and held a workshop in Seoul in July. The ROKG plans to attend the next workshop in Sydney in September, and has expressed interest in attending the interdiction exercises in Singapore in October. PSI is an international, interagency effort aimed at preventing or interdicting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction using existing domestic laws and established international agreements. The ROKG currently is formulating an interagency strategy for its effective PSI participation.
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U.S.-ROK Global Partnership
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12. (C) The ROK also wants to play a bigger role on other global issues and the following are good areas for increased cooperation:
-- Democracy and Human Rights: The ROK has demonstrated a new readiness to address human rights concerns in the DPRK, co-sponsoring the annual UNGA North Korea human rights resolution in 2008 for the first time. In October 2008 the ROK agreed to chair the first Senior Officials' Meeting of the Asia-Pacific Democracy Partnership, a U.S.-supported regional subset of the Community of Democracies.
-- Climate Change: Korea, the 13th largest per capita emitter of greenhouse gases and the world,s 15th largest economy in terms of GDP, is playing a constructive role in discussions on global climate change. The ROKG shares the U.S. view that that investment in new and renewable energy sources not only can reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but also can create jobs, spur economic growth, and enhance energy security. The U.S. Department of Energy is engaged in a variety of collaborative R&D activities with Korea, including in nuclear energy, fusion, gas hydrates, "smart grids," and other new and renewable energy technologies, but there is room to expand and strengthen our cooperation.
-- Development Assistance: Korea's overseas development assistance program currently includes nearly USD 500 million in Official Development Assistance (ODA), as well as a roughly similar figure for North Korea (suspended). The ROKG target is to triple ODA (as a percentage of GDP) by 2015. With limited functional and regional capacity, Korea should be receptive to policy discussions on ODA coordination.
-- Counter-Proliferation: The ROKG has told Iranian counterparts at every opportunity that Tehran's uranium enrichment activities are unacceptable and has supported the P5-plus-1 incentives package.
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FTA and Economic Issues
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13. (C) President Lee has faced criticism from his opponents for his inability to generate momentum for the Korea-U.S. (KORUS) FTA in Washington. President Obama's statement at the April G20 meeting with Lee, that the U.S. wanted to find a way forward on the KORUS FTA, allayed some of the anxiety in Seoul, and enabled Lee to push the FTA through the committee of jurisdiction in Korea,s National Assembly in late April. A full plenary vote in the National Assembly has not been scheduled; while opponents are vocal, the KORUS FTA continues to receive about a 60 percent approval Korean public opinion polls, is strongly supported by the majority GNP party, and is expected to pass once there is some sign of movement in Washington. The Obama Administration is conducting a thorough review of the KORUS FTA and consulting closely with all stakeholders to understand the exact nature of their concerns, to develop recommendations for addressing them. To assist with this review, and to ensure that all who may have an interest in this free trade agreement are able to fully express their views, we issued a Federal Register Notice on July 27, 2009, requesting comments on the KORUS FTA.
14. (C) Korea is our seventh largest trading partner, with total merchandise trade in 2008 of over USD 82 billion (and more than USD 100 billion if services are included). The U.S. International Trade Commission estimated in September 2007 that U.S. merchandise exports to Korea would expand by USD 10-12 billion on an annual basis as a result of the FTA and that services exports would also expand. The United States has traditionally been the ROK's biggest trading partner in the post-WWII era. One tangible sign of China's growing importance in Asia and in Korea, however, is that China displaced the United States as Korea's top trading partner in 2004. By 2008, China-ROK merchandise trade reached USD 168 billion, doubling the U.S.-ROK total. With respect to North Korea, China accounts for nearly 50 percent of that country's total trade. The growing economic and political role of China on the Korean peninsula is one of the most important motivations for Korea to enter into FTA negotiations with the United States. Successive ROK Governments have seen the ratification and implementation of the KORUS FTA as symbolic of the U.S. will to remain fully engaged in Northeast Asia in the face of increasing Chinese influence.
15. (C) Korea also wants to conclude an FTA with the United States because Korean economic reformers recognize that the Korean economy needs to liberalize and open in order to promote greater competitiveness vis--vis China and Japan. South Korea has concluded a number of FTAs and launched negotiations on others since the signing of the KORUS FTA negotiations on June 30, 2007. The ROK has implemented FTAs with Chile, Singapore, EFTA, and ASEAN (except investment). The ROK has concluded negotiations with India and signing is reportedly imminent. Negotiations are underway with Canada, Mexico, the Gulf Cooperation Council, Australia, New Zealand, and Peru. In July, the ROKG announced that negotiations on the EU-Korea FTA were concluded (but the agreement is not yet igned). ROK media have been filled with stories of the increasing economic weight of Europe in Korea as a result of the FTA. The Board of Governors of the American Chamber of Commerce has expressed concern that the EU-Korea FTA will disadvantage the competitiveness of U.S. firms vis--vis their European competitors in Korea.
16. (C) The reopening of the beef market was accomplished in an April 2008 agreement separate from the FTA. Under this agreement, the United States and Korea agreed to reopen Korea,s market to U.S. beef and beef products in a manner fully consistent with international standards and science. In June 2008, following massive street protests in Seoul, U.S. beef exporters and Korean beef importers reached a temporary commercial agreement to only export beef and beef products from cattle under 30 months of age, as a transitional measure, until Korean consumer confidence improves. While beef sales have not yet returned to past levels due to Korea,s currency exchange fluctuations, increased competition from Australian beef, and lingering public concerns about the safety of U.S. beef, the market is open and we expect increased sales over the medium term. Korea is also watching closely our ongoing negotiations with other countries that have stricter restrictions on U.S. beef.
17. (C) On the global financial reform discussions, Korea is a strong ally in the G-20 process (which it will chair in 2010). Korea is enthusiastic about the G20 as the global forum for action on the global financial system. The ROKG is concerned that European countries are advocating other formulas for such discussions that would exclude Korea. Within the G20, President Lee has called for a strong fiscal response and refraining from protectionism as well as necessary regulatory improvements. President Lee Myung-bak has strongly argued that it would be premature to withdraw the national fiscal stimulus packages at this juncture. Korea sees itself as lining up on the U.S. side on almost all G20 debates.
18. (C) The Korean economy is looking better and is increasingly forecast to be one of the first major economies to emerge from recession. The benchmark KOSPI stock index in early August reached the highest level since mid-August 2008 and the won, the Korean currency, closed at 1218 per dollar on August 4, the strongest level since October 14, 2008. Most analysts foresee further strengthening of the won in the months ahead. The picture looked far different last fall, when the financial crisis hit Korea hard. A USD 30 billion swap line extended by the U.S. Federal Reserve in October, as the Korean won was plummeting and Korea looked to be on the brink of a financial panic, helped Korea weather the orst of the storm, and gained tremendous gratitude. The later Japanese and Chinese swap mechanisms did not have the same impact. In the closing months of 2008 Korea experienced dramatic contraction of demand for its exports. The ROKG's stabilization and stimulus packages mitigated the impact and the weakened currency has generated a significant current account surplus in recent months. Sectors of the Korean economy facing restructuring challenges include construction, shipbuilding, shipping and automotive. GM Daewoo, GM,s Korean subsidiary, is negotiating with the Korea Development Bank for a sizeable loanto restructure its operations.
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North Korea
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19. (C) Presidents Obama and Lee agreed to send a clear message to North Korea that its provocations come at a price. They also agreed on principles to deal with North Korea's nuclear and missile threats, including commitments to achieving the "complete and verifiable elimination" of North Korea's nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs as well as the ballistic missile program. Korean officials ontinue to seek assurances that the United States will consult closely with the ROK on its North Korea policy and that the United States will not recognize North Korea as a nuclear state.
20. (C) North Korea policy is almost always the most sensitive issue on the South Korean agenda. Fifty-five years of alliance notwithstanding, the ROKG still fears being left out or surprised by Washington's initiatives or policy changes on North Korea. Simply put, the ROKG must be seen by South Koreans as being informed and consulted on all USG moves on North Korea. Korean officials see Washington and Seoul as partners in forming and implementing policies toward the North and consistently seek affirmation that Washington will not allow Pyongyang to drive a wedge between us.
21. (C) There is virtually no chance of early improvement in South-North relations; President Lee is determined to stick to principle and to insist on a more reciprocal relationship with the North, and Kim Jong-il will not give in for his own domestic reasons. Importantly, South Koreans appear tired of, but not particularly bothered by, the continuing threatening rhetoric from the North, and therefore seem largely comfortable with their government's stance. Heightening tensions in the West Sea and missile launches have created less public anxiety than might be expected. The ROKG will welcome the opportunity to present with you a united front of calm and determination toward the North, combined with a call to return to the Six- Party Talks.
22. (SBU) The Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) is the only remaining joint economic project between North and South Korea. (The other joint venture, Mt. Kumkang tours, was closed on July 11, 2008, after North Korean security forces shot a South Korean tourist to death.) Located in North Korea, six miles north of the DMZ, the KIC opened in December 2004 and is home to 106 ROK-owned factories employing approximately 40,000 North Korean workers (84 percent are women age 20-39). Since late 2008, North-South tensions regarding the KIC have increased. The DPRK closed the border temporarily on multiple occasions, and has placed limits on the number of South Korean employees allowed in the KIC. The DPRK is demanding drastically higher wages for employees (up from USD 55 to USD 300 per month), construction of additional dormitories and an additional fee of USD 500 million for land usage.
23. (SBU) North Koreans detained a South Korean Hyundai Asan employee working at KIC on March 30, accusing him of defaming North Korea and attempting to suborn a North Korean female worker. In addition to securing the release of the ROK citizen, South Korea's priorities at the KIC include guaranteeing employee safety, freedom of access and border-crossing, and increasing the number of North Korean workers brought in from outside the Kaesong area. Although the South Korean firms at KIC are concerned about the current tension and complain of financial losses, only one company has withdrawn from KIC to date.
24. (SBU) The DPRK and the ROK have held four rounds of negotiations between April and July 2009 without any breakthrough, with the most recent session taking place on July 2. Both sides appear to be committed to continuing KIC operations. The United States has consistently supported North-South dialogue and expressed hope that the two sides will resolve their disputes over the KIC.
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VWP/WEST
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25. (U) The ROK was included in the the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) in October 2008. This step has been a success in facilitating travel and improving people-to-people ties between nations. As of the beginning of July, approximately 200,000 Koreans had applied for VWP approval using the ESTA (Electronic Approval for Travel Authorization). More than 99 percent of the ESTA applications have been approved and we continue to see an upward trend in ESTA usage.
26. (U) The WEST (Work, English Study, and Travel) program, inaugurated in March 2009, allows qualifying college students and recent graduates to enter the U.S. for up to 18 months on J-1 exchange visitor visas that allow them to study English, participate in professional-level internships and travel independently. A group of 185 Korean students have already travelled to the U.S. on the WEST program and a second wave of 159 is preparing to depart. As of December 2008, there were 110,000 South Koreans studying in the U.S. at all levels, from elementary to graduate school. According to Korean Ministry of Education data for 2007, 27% of all post-graduate students choosing to study abroad chose to study in the U.S.
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The Bottom Line
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27. (C) South Korea is a like-minded, energetic partner that is ready, prepared, and wants to have a broader and deeper alliance with the United States. Koreans would like the alliance to be a lot more than a security arrangement. Yes, they want more say, even a more equal relationship, but this is only part of their motivation. Rather, they see that their ties with the U.S. are deeper now than ever; witness, for example, the two million-strong Korean American community, and the enormous numbers of Koreans studying in the United States. Above all, however, a very large majority of South Koreans are convinced that the ROK and the United States have shared values and shared strategic interests. It's time to take the relationship to a new level of global partnership, even as we deepen our cooperation on the Korean peninsula.
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Your Meetings
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28. (C) You are scheduled to meet with President Lee Myung-bak, National security Advisor Kim Sung-hwan, Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan, Trade Minister Kim Jong-hoon, Speaker of the National Assembly Kim Hyong-o, and Chairman of the National Assembly Foreign Affairs, Trade and Unification Committee Park Jin. Likely topics of discussion include:
-- North Korea: Your interlocutors may seek assurances that the U.S. will consult closely with the ROK on its North Korea policy and that the U.S. will not recognize North Korea as a nuclear state.
-- U.S.-ROK Alliance: Your interlocutors may stress the importance of the U.S. commitment to the defense of the Korean peninsula.
-- Global Partnership: Your interlocutors may gauge your level of interest in ROK contributions to reconstruction and stabilization of vital countries such as Afghanistan and Pakistan; ROK peacekeeping in Lebanon; and anti-piracy efforts off the coast of Somalia.
-- FTA: Your interlocutors will seek your views on the prospects for Congressional approval of the agreement. The Trade Minister will stress that the FTA represents a balance of American and Korean interests and that the ROKG cannot re-negotiate the text of the FTA.
STEPHENS
7. Viewing cable 09SEOUL1171, A/S CAMPBELL’S MEETING WITH ROK UNIFICATION
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin 09SEOUL1171 2009-07-24 07:07 2010-11-29 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Seoul VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHUL #1171/01 2050738
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 240738Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5111
INFO RUCNKOR/KOREA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUACAAA/COMUSKOREA INTEL SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSFK SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY Friday, 24 July 2009, 07:38
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001171
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 07/24/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PINR, ECON, KN, KS
SUBJECT: A/S CAMPBELL’S MEETING WITH ROK UNIFICATION
MINISTER HYUN IN-TAEK
Classified By: Ambassador Stephens. Reasons 1.4(b/d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: In a July 20 meeting, Unification Minister Hyun In-taek outlined Kim Jong-il’s health and succession concerns, key figures and the current state of the DPRK for A/S Campbell. Although Kim Jong-il (KJI) remained firmly in control of the regime for now, he was unlikely to live beyond 2015. On succession, Hyun observed the current succession preparations for Kim Jung-un were “rushed,” and anticipated additional “fireworks” (either a third nuclear test or missile launches) at the end of the current 150-day campaign, scheduled to end in mid-October. North Korea would return to dialogue afterwards. North Korea is suffering from severe food shortage and devastating economic crisis caused by lack of foreign aid, economic foundation and decent harvest. The situation is worse than the 1996/ 1997 crisis, because the economic uncertainty is taking place during, not after, a power transition period. Desperate for cash, Hyun believed North Korea would sell nuclear technology to potential buyers. North Korea desired to be a “strong state,” ideologically, militarily and economically. Nuclear power would allow two of the three: ideological and military strength. The role of the DPRK Foreign Ministry diminished after Kim Gae-kwan failed to “deal with the United States.” The Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) remained a source for cash for the DPRK; it was also a potential window of opportunity for inter-Korean cooperation, and at the same time a potential political liability for both Koreas. Hyun believed North Korea after KJI’s death would look very different than the current state and require economic assistance from South Korea and the United States. Hyun also underscored the importance the U.S.-ROK cooperation and believed a unified Korea should be nuclear free. END SUMMARY.
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KJI’s Heath and Succession
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2. (C) While KJI’s overall political power remained “firm and strong,” his health was weakening, Hyun said. South Korean analysts believed that KJI was unlikely to live more than 3 to 5 years, although he seemed to be doing better lately. MOU had not discovered any firm basis for rumored pancreatic cancer, reports of which stemmed from a Japanese press article with a Beijing source. Wang Jiarui, Director for PRC Communist Party International Liaison Department, told Hyun that when he had met with KJI in January, Wang could not detect any scars on KJI’s head from his widely reported surgery after suffering a stroke. Also, KJI did not look as though he would die soon when he attended the 15-year commemoration of the death of his father, Kim Il-sung, on July 8. KJI remained for the entire duration of the celebration -- over three hours -- and met with his staff for about 20 minutes after the event.
3. (C) Hyun observed that the current, “rushed,” pace of succession preparation in the North was noteworthy. “Semi-officially,” Hyun said, the transition had started, with some power and authority already transferred to the youngest son, Kim Jong-un, who had already been recognized publicly as a “young commander” and a “brilliant star.” The current 150-day campaign, scheduled to end in mid-October, was to provide a boost to a smoother transition. Hyun said he expected further nuclear and/or missile tests in October; perhaps, after that, North Korea would return to the nuclear talks.
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Return to Dialogue After October
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4. (C) Hyun said it was only a matter of time before North Korea returned to the nuclear talks; the only question was when. North Korea faced a severely degraded economy, serious food shortages, and a shortage of foreign currency. It could resist for a while, but not for a long time. The Five Parties, therefore, should focus on how to manage the return of North Korea to the negotiations. If the return was not well managed, there would be poor results. The United States and South Korea must apply patience and pressure.
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The Current State of North Korea
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5. (C) According to Hyun, North Korea now faced a very difficult economic situation, similar to the conditions in
1996 and 1997. Hyun pointed out that North Korea “produces nothing” and had “no meaningful trade” with the outside world. On food, Hyun said that North Korea was now asking private ROK entities for food assistance. Hyun confirmed that the ROKG did not send food aid or fertilizer to the DPRK from 2008 to present. Having also refused U.S. food aid, the DPRK was severely suffering, and the food situation would not improve soon, Hyun said. Since early July, North Korea had suffered from unusually heavy rainfall, which would have a devastating effect on the harvest this year.
6. (C) On inter-Korean trade, Hyun cited data from the Korea Development Institute (KDI), which showed a sharp decrease in inter-Korean trade over the past six months. Moreover, inter-Korean projects such as Mt. Kumkang and Kaesong city tours, major sources of cash, had dried up completely because they were closed in July and December 2008. The remaining, legitimate, cash flow for the North is now the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), from which the North receives about USD 35 million for its 40,000 workers. Hyun believed that North Korea could, and would, sell nuclear technology, and even plutonium.
7. (C) Hyun assessed that Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile tests were to earn “one big deal” with the United States. North Korea wanted to be recognized as a nuclear state. North Korea’s goals were to become ideologically, militarily, and economically a strong state. Aiming to achieve “strength” in all areas by 2012, the year when North Korea will “enter the gateway to become a strong and prosperous nation,” according North Korean schedule. Hyun said the ideological goal was already achieved through Kim Il-sung’s Juche, or self-reliance, ideology. The DPRK’s aim to become a military power was “nearly achieved,” through the North’s nuclear and missile capabilities. In North Korea’s view, ideological and military strength would come from becoming a nuclear power. When North Korea would “gain strength” on all three fronts, it would also obtain the recognition and respect from the rest of the world.
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Key players
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8. (C) Hyun identified Jang Sung-taek as the central figure in North Korea at the moment, probably the second-in-command. However, Jang did not oversee serious military issues, including nuclear and missile programs. On military issues, key authority was held by the National Defense Committee. Among the committee members, Hyun said Joo koo-chan was responsible for the rocket launch, and Oh Kuk-ryul and Kim Young-choon were key decision makers within the military. Other National Defense Committee members, such as Cho Myung-rok, who had met President Clinton, were not doing well because of old age. Oh Kuk-ryul and Kim Young-choon were also old, but remained active. According to Hyun’s sources, Kim Young-choon suffers from bad hearing, but remained one of KJI’s close confidants. Apparently, KJI called for Kim Young-choon twice on July 8, at the celebration of the 15th anniversary of KIS’s death -- a clear sign of influence. Hyun also identified Kim Jeong-gak as “very powerful,” but underscored that KJI still controls “everything, including the military.”
-----------------------------------
Diminishing Foreign Ministry’s Role
-----------------------------------
9. (C) In the past, the DPRK Foreign Ministry enjoyed some of influence and power, as a check-and-balance element of the DPRK regime. Currently, that balance system has broken down and the foreign ministry’s role has diminished considerably. One reason for this downfall, according to Hyun, was the perceived failure of the Six-Party Talks (6PT) where Kim Gye-kwan did “not deal with the United States successfully.” Hyun said that the North Korean authorities expected a lot from Kim Gye-kwan, but he had “failed to deliver.”
-------------------------------
Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC)
-------------------------------
10. (C) Hyun saw the KIC as a window of opportunity for inter-Korean development, especially in introducing South Korean capitalism to the North. Run by South Korean managers and machines, the KIC provides glimpse of the South Korean way of life to over 40,000 North Korean workers and their external families. The workers’ change in appearance and way
of thinking was visible, Hyun said. The 40,000 KIC workers could spread the South Korea’s way of life to their families, thus directly affecting some 150,000 people around Kaesong city. Hyun also noted that, the KIC was a divisive issue in South Korea too. The North could use KIC to “divide” the South, Hyun assessed, but still, Hyun said, most of South Korea, including the ROKG, did not want the project to fail.
-----------
Way forward
-----------
11. (C) Hyun believed North Korea after KJI’s death would look very different, requiring considerable economic assistance from South Korea, the United States and international community. Hyun advised that in case of a sudden collapse in North Korea, the ROKG and USG should move quickly toward unification of the Korean peninsula. There was “no disagreement” among ROK agencies on this point, Hyun said. The USG could expect “full cooperation” from the ROKG; unification was the goal of South Korea. Hyun underscored the importance the U.S.-ROK cooperation and stated that a unified Korea should be nuclear free.
12. (U) A/S Campbell has cleared this message. STEPHENS
8. Viewing cable 09BEIJING1761, PRC/DPRK: CHINESE SCHOLARS ON UNSCR 1874
ANDReference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BEIJING1761 2009-06-26 07:07 2010-11-29 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Beijing
Appears in these articles:
nytimes.com
O 260714Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4839
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
CIA WASHINGTON DC
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
DIA WASHINGTON DC
CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
OSD WASHDC
DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
NSC WASHDCC O N F I D E N T I A L BEIJING 001761
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2034
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM KNNP MOPS EFIN KN KS CH
SUBJECT: PRC/DPRK: CHINESE SCHOLARS ON UNSCR 1874 AND
POSSIBLE NEXT STEPS FOR CHINA AND WASHINGTON
Classified By: Deputy Political Section Chief Ben Moeling.
Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
SUMMARY
-------
1. (C) Chinese scholars in recent conversations with PolOff said that Pyongyang's response to UNSCR 1874 had been "tepid" so far and that North Korea's domestic political situation did not appear to be tense. The DPRK had not anticipated such a strong reaction to its nuclear test from the international community, especially from China and Russia. Several contacts insisted that the Six-Party Talks were "not dead yet" and remained a good framework to discuss the DPRK nuclear issue. Although Seoul and Tokyo would likely urge Washington to take a harder line on the DPRK, Chinese scholars urged the United States to take the lead on resolving the North Korean nuclear problem and not be "led by the nose" by its treaty allies. One contact proposed a U.S.-PRC-Russia trilateral dialogue to generate new ideas on the future of Northeast Asia. In light of the threat posed by North Korea, a former MFA official said China should strengthen its export control regime and target materials related to uranium enrichment activities. He also urged Washington and Beijing to have a discussion about strengthening the monitoring of illegal financial activities during the Strategic and Economic Dialogue. End Summary.
UNSCR 1874
----------
2. (C) Pyongyang's response to UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1874 so far, including the June 13 Foreign Ministry statement and the June 15 mass rally in Pyongyang, had been "surprisingly tepid," claimed XXXXXXXXXXXX negotiations during a XXXXXXXXXXXX discussion. Pyongyang's threats to weaponize plutonium and begin enriching uranium were "empty threats" and it was clear that North Korea had run out of leverage. XXXXXXXXXXXX opined that the DPRK had miscalculated and had not anticipated that there would be such a strong reaction to its nuclear test from the international community, including China and Russia. Pyongyang, he added, was "scared" of U.S. military pressure.
3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX noted in a XXXXXXXXXXXX conversation with PolOff that senior North Korean leaders, including officials from the influential National Defense Commission, were noticeably absent from the Pyongyang rally protesting UNSCR 1874 that had been attended by tens of thousands North Koreans. This signaled to XXXXXXXXXXXX that the domestic situation was not that tense.
4. (C) Pyongyang, said XXXXXXXXXXXX, was unhappy with China's support of Resolution 1874. China would have no problem implementing UNSCR 1874 but would do so in its "own way," he added. XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested that China's enforcement would elicit a reaction from Pyongyang, and recalled that the DPRK Embassy had complained to him previously about China's strict enforcement of UNSCR 1718, especially with regard to inspection of possible dual-use items. Regarding new restrictions placed on individual North Koreans, XXXXXXXXXXXX expressed concern that it would be difficult for Chinese host organizations to confirm the details of every individual North Korean participating in a visiting delegation.
5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX , urged the United States and other nations not to go beyond the scope of the resolution. He noted to PolOff in a XXXXXXXXXXXX conversation that PRC President Hu Jintao had sought to have a balanced response to the nuclear test by supporting Resolution 1874 but had failed to fully please Washington or Pyongyang.
Future Nuclear or Missile Tests?
--------------------------------
6. (C) Pyongyang would not conduct a third nuclear test unless absolutely necessary, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX. He predicted that North Korea was more likely to conduct a missile test, but noted that missile tests were extremely expensive for the regime. North Korea's recent nuclear and missile tests had been possible because the country had had two consecutive years of good harvests, he speculated.
Six-Party Talks: "Not Dead Yet"
-------------------------------
7. (C) Several contacts insisted that the Six-Party Talks remained a good framework to discuss the DPRK nuclear issue. The Six-Party Talks were not "dead yet," said XXXXXXXXXXXX. He urged the United States not to set any preconditions on the DPRK returning to negotiations. The United States should be willing to talk to the DPRK so that Pyongyang did not become "desperate." The long-term objective was still denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the medium term aim was to prevent more missile and nuclear tests and a regional arms race, said XXXXXXXXXXXX.
Washington Should Take the Lead
-------------------------------
8. (C) Several contacts urged the United States to take the lead on resolving the DPRK nuclear issue. Several suggested it was essential that Washington not be "led by the nose" by Tokyo and Seoul. XXXXXXXXXXXX acknowledged that, for understandable reasons, the ROK and Japan tended to take a harder line on North Korea. While the real threat to South Korea posed by the DPRK nuclear test and missile launches was minimal, he acknowledged the psychological threat the tests posed to the ROK, especially to its economy. While Washington should certainly consult with Tokyo and Seoul, it should be wary of being pushed by its allies to take a more strident position. "Harsh enforcement" of UNSCR 1874 might push Pyongyang to retaliate, cautioned XXXXXXXXXXXX.
9. (C) China was reluctant to be at the forefront of attempts to resolve this issue, assessed XXXXXXXXXXXX. Recalling Beijing's failure to prevent the first DPRK nuclear test in 2006, XXXXXXXXXXXX admitted that China had a credibility issue. He expressed hope that Washington could come up with a bold proposal to break the current deadlock.
10. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX emphasized the importance of China-U.S. cooperation and suggested that if Washington wanted to engage in bilateral talks with Pyongyang, Beijing could help facilitate the engagement and be a mediator. XXX also suggested a possible U.S.-PRC-Russia trilateral dialogue on the future of Northeast Asia as a useful mechanism noting that all three countries were members of both the Six-Party Talks and the P5.
Sustainable Security
--------------------
11. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested that Sino-American cooperation on the DPRK issue presented opportunities to address more fundamental issues such as the concept of "sustainable security." XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that the United States, despite having invested energy, money, and lives on the global war on terror, had not necessarily increased the security of the American people. In the long-term, Beijing and Washington needed to find ways to guarantee the strategic security of other countries, including North Korea. Doing so would require less investment and offer greater security returns, he suggested, emphasizing that military power alone would not resolve the DPRK issue. Peaceful multilateral processes, such as the Six-Party Talks, would be more effective, he concluded.
Strengthen Export Controls and Financial Sanctions
--------------------------------------------- -----
12. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said China was happy to see the adoption of UNSCR 1874, but he questioned the effectiveness of the counterproliferation and financial sanctions on the DPRK regime. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, the DPRK had a limited stock of plutonium, possibly enough for two more bombs, and did not appear to have a working uranium enrichment program yet. Thus, he concluded, Washington and Beijing should focus on preventing the further development of the DPRK's uranium enrichment program. XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested that China strengthen its export control regime and target materials that North Korea might need for its highly enriched uranium (HEU) program. XXXXXXXXXXXX advised that the current level of risk posed by North Korea's provocative behavior was "affordable" since North Korea did not have any HEU in the pipeline or have a sustainable source of fissile material. However, once Pyongyang developed its HEU capabilities, the situation would become much more dangerous and difficult to resolve, warned XXXXXXXXXXXX.
13. (C) On financial sanctions, XXXXXXXXXXXX urged the United States and China to have a discussion about strengthening the monitoring of illegal financial activities, possibly including terrorism finance, corruption, and proliferation finance during the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED). It would be more effective, cheaper and less risky to intercept financial transactions for proliferation-related materials, especially since North Korea only had a few financial outlets, than to enforce the interdiction of contraband goods, suggested XXXXXXXXXXXX. The global financial crisis had spurred international cooperation on financial matters and Washington and Beijing should take advantage of this opportunity to enhance the monitoring of illegal financial transactions. He emphasized that this type of monitoring should be done on a global scale, and not simply targeted at the DPRK, said XXXXXXXXXXXX.
PICCUTA
9. Viewing cable 09BEIJING1634, CDA AND MFA ASIAN AFFAIRS ON DPRK
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BEIJING1634 2009-06-17 06:06 2010-11-29 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Beijing
Appears in these articles:
nytimes.com
VZCZCXRO0731
OO RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHBJ #1634/01 1680645
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 170645Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4582
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DCC O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 001634
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/CM AND EAP/K
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/17/2034
TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV CH KN KS
SUBJECT: CDA AND MFA ASIAN AFFAIRS ON DPRK
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Dan Piccuta. Reasons 1.4 (b/d
).
Summary
1. (C) In a June 16 luncheon in honor of visiting Hong Kong CG Joe Donovan hosted by the Charge, XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX said that China liked a U.S. proposal described by Ambassador Bosworth here on June 5 to put all issues related to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula into a package for negotiation. XXXXXXXXXXXX maintained that the United States holds the key to bringing the DPRK back to the negotiation table and suggested that succession concerns in North Korea might be causing Kim Jong-il to escalate tensions with the United States so that his successor, perhaps Kim Jong-un, could then step in to ease pressure. XXXXXXXXXXXX acknowledged that China experts believe the DPRK has been processing highly enriched uranium but asserted that the program was only in an initial phase. XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested that ROK envoy to the Six-Party Talks had not offered any new ideas during his June 9 visit to Beijing and that Japan's focus on the abductee issue continued to cause concerns at the MFA. End Summary.
Chinese Protests to DPRK Have Had No Effect
-------------------------------------------
2. (C) In a June 16 luncheon hosted by the Charge, XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX made clear that the PRC viewed recent provocative actions by the DPRK as having gone too far. He assured the Charge that Chinese officials had expressed Chinese displeasure to North Korean counterparts and had pressed the DPRK to return to the negotiation table. Unfortunately, XXXXXXXXXXXX added, those protests had had "no effect." "The only country that can make progress with the North Koreans is the United States," he maintained. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that, although China had assured North Korean leaders that the United States was ready to have bilateral talks with them, the North Koreans had insisted that any message from the United States to the DPRK should be delivered directly, not through China. XXXXXXXXXXXX took this as further evidence that only by having direct talks with the United States would North Korea return to the Six-Party Talks.
China Likes a Package Approach
------------------------------
3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX told the Charge that China viewed favorably the USG proposal of putting all facets of a possible Korean Peninsula denuclearization agreement into one package. XXXXXXXXXXXX characterized Chinese and U.S. core interests in a nuclear free Korean Peninsula as "shared." He reminded his hosts that Punggye, the site of the DPRK nuclear test, was near the Chinese border and that any accident there could have had dire consequences for Northeast China. XXXXXXXXXXXX insisted that China was as concerned as the United States about proliferation from North Korea. The only difference in the China and U.S. positions, XXXXXXXXXXXX maintained, was "the United States was the key while China was only in a position to apply a little oil to the lock."
Building Trust
--------------
4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX cautioned that building trust between the DPRK and the United States would be difficult. In North Korea's view, XXXXXXXXXXXX explained, the destruction of its nuclear capability was an irreversible step while decisions by the United States could be easily reversed. When CGs Donovan and Goldberg both pointed out that trust was a two-way street and that North Korea had not evinced a great deal of it, XXXXXXXXXXXX was evasive. When pressed whether he believed the DPRK had been reprocessing highly enriched uranium (HEU), XXXXXXXXXXXX said yes, adding that Chinese experts believed the enrichment was only in its initial phases and that any DPRK HEU program would not be "very useful."
Domestic Concerns in North Korea Influence Talks
--------------------------------------------- ---
5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested that domestic politics in North Korea were in a large way responsible for Pyongyang's recent actions. He was dismissive of DPRK justifications for the nuclear test as a response to the UN Security Council BEIJING 00001634 002 OF 002 Presidential Statement critical of North Korea's April 5 Taepo-Dong 2 launch. "Kim Jong-il was obviously planning the nuclear test at the same time as the missile launch so his justification for the test makes no sense," XXXXXXXXXXXX said. XXXXXXXXXXXX opined that the rapid pace of provocative actions in North Korea was due to Kim Jong-il's declining health and might be part of a gambit under which Kim Jong-il would escalate tensions with the United States so that his successor, presumably Kim Jong-un, could then step in and ease those tensions.
6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX told the Charge that he kept abreast of Western media reports about North Korea. XXXXXXXXXXXX cautioned that U.S. experts should not assume North Korea would implode after Kim Jong-il's death. He said that PRC analysts concluded that the regime would still function normally and discounted strongly any suggestion that the system would collapse once Kim Jong-il disappeared.
ROK has no new ideas - Japan can only scuttle talks
--------------------------------------------- ------
7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said that ROK Six-Party Talks envoy Wi Sung-lac had met with VFM Wu Dawei on June 9 but had offered nothing new. "The South Koreans have plenty of ideas, but we've heard them all before," he complained, adding that the ROK government was too close to the situation in North Korea to be objective. Turning to Japan, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that Japan's obsession with the abductee issue reminded him of a Chinese expression for an individual who was too weak to make something work, yet strong enough to destroy it.
Participants
-------------
Charge Dan Piccuta
Joe Donovan, U.S. Consul General Hong Kong
Robert Goldberg, Consul General Guangzhou
Mark Lambert, Regional Unit Chief
Jim Brown, interpreter
XXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXX
PICCUTA
10. Viewing cable 09BEIJING1176, XXXXXXXXXXXXDISCUSSES G-20, DPRK,
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin 09BEIJING1176 2009-04-30 13:01 2010-11-29 21:09 SECRET Embassy Beijing VZCZCXRO3320
OO RUEHBC RUEHCN RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHGH RUEHKUK RUEHVC
DE RUEHBJ #1176/01 1201307
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 301307Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3773
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 6920
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0575
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIJING 001176
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 04/30/2034
TAGS PREL, ECON, EFIN, PARM, PHUM, KUNR, CH, TW, KN, KS,
JA, IR, PK, AF
SUBJECT: XXXXXXXXXXXXDISCUSSES G-20, DPRK,
IRAN, AF/PAK, UNSC REFORM, TAIWAN, TIBET WITH CHARGE
Classified By: Charge d’Affaires, a.i. Dan Piccuta. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
Summary
-------
1. (C) Taiwan’s participation as an observer at the upcoming May World Health Assembly (WHA) meetings demonstrated what could be achieved based on “one China, very broadly interpreted,” XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX working lunch hosted by the Charge d’Affaires. XXXXXXXXXXXX said he would ask for appropriate meetings in Washington to discuss the dates and agenda of the next G-20 summit. XXXXXXXXXXXX reviewed several issues he hoped to discuss during his upcoming visit to Washington: On North Korea, China encouraged the United States to re-engage the DPRK, but if the Six-Party Talks were suspended for an extended period, we should consider maintaining engagement in other ways. On Iran, Beijing appreciated the “bold steps” taken by Washington and had told Tehran that this represented a good opportunity for Iran to resume a positive role in the region. On Afghanistan/Pakistan, XXXXXXXXXXXX asked to see a list of items that would be transported via the proposed Northern Distribution Network, given that “non-lethal” is a broad and vague term.
2. (S) Summary Continued: XXXXXXXXXXXX raised concerns over China’s “core interests” of Tibet and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, which he said could “derail” bilateral cooperation. The Charge raised the Liu Xiaobo and Gao Zhisheng human rights cases, to which XXXXXXXXXXXX replied with standard language about Chinese law. The Charge asked for assistance in expediting the exit from China of two North Koreans from the U.S. Embassy compound; XXXXXXXXXXXX promised to assist. The Charge urged China to press North Korea to release the two detained American journalists; XXXXXXXXXXXX said China would. XXXXXXXXXXXX expressed concern over building “momentum” on UNSC reform and asked the United States not to be “proactive” on the matter. The Charge expressed concern that differences regarding a Conditions of Construction Agreement (COCA) II for our new Consulate General in Guangzhou had begun to affect other parts of our support for each other’s practical needs including residential leases and asked for XXXXXXXXXXXX’s assistance in stopping this trend. The Charge and XXXXXXXXXXXX agreed on the importance of high-level meetings to the bilateral relationship and reviewed a number of recent and upcoming visits. End Summary.
TAIWAN OBSERVERSHIP AT WHA
--------------------------
3. (C) The agreement allowing Taiwan to participate as an observer at the World Health Assembly (WHA) meetings in Geneva in May was “one step forward” toward better cross-Strait relations and demonstrated what could be achieved through consultations based on “one China, very broadly interpreted,” XXXXXXXXXXXX said at a XXXXXXXXXXXX working lunch hosted by the Charge d’Affaires. Cross-Strait relations were “improving,” and as they did, China hoped the United States would feel “less burdened, frustrated and nervous,” XXXXXXXXXXXX said. The Charge congratulated XXXXXXXXXXXX on the agreement, noting its timeliness in light of concerns over the H1N1 outbreak, while expressing hope that both sides would continue to take steps to increase mutual trust.
IMPORTANCE OF BILATERAL VISITS
-------------------------------
4. (C) The Charge and XXXXXXXXXXXX agreed on the importance of high-level meetings to the bilateral relationship and reviewed a number of recent and upcoming visits. Both concurred that Chief of Naval Operations ADM Roughead’s visit to China was a success. The Charge emphasized that, as President Obama told Foreign Minister Yang, the United States wanted to move relations between our two militaries forward. XXXXXXXXXXXX agreed that State Councilor Liu Yandong’s visit, including her meeting with Secretary Clinton, had been productive. XXXXXXXXXXXX said Liu came away “very impressed” by her interaction with Secretary Clinton and wanted very much to “follow up” on the issues they discussed such as education, something very basic and important to the people of both countries.
5. (C) Although we recognize the importance of the proposed visit by Politburo Member and CCP Organization Department
BEIJING 00001176 002 OF 005
Head Li Yuanchao, it would be easier to arrange a successful visit if Li could postpone his travel to a less busy time, the Charge said. XXXXXXXXXXXX replied that the visit of Li, a “future leader of China,” was “very important,” so China hoped the United States would provide a full schedule of meetings with senior leaders despite the fact that those leaders recently met with State Councilor Liu. The Charge urged XXXXXXXXXXXX to arrange a useful schedule for Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, including a trip to Tibet or Tibetan areas, noting that the Speaker was also particularly interested in climate change and environmental issues. China would treat Speaker Pelosi’s visit as a type of “state visit,” XXXXXXXXXXXX replied. Nevertheless, given her “tight schedule,” the Speaker would likely “not have time” to visit Tibet, XXXXXXXXXXXX said.
6. (C) Reviewing the upcoming meetings between Presidents Obama and Hu this year,XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that, over the past 30 years, the U.S.-China relationship had been driven by high-level visits to a greater degree than other bilateral relationships. With these meetings between our two presidents in mind, both sides should be “careful” and act in ways that benefit the long-term interests of the bilateral relationship. Our two presidents would meet several times in the coming months, including at the G-8, G-20 and APEC summits, after which China anticipated President Obama would visit China. We should plan our work for the bilateral relationship in the year ahead with the President’s visit to China in mind.
G-20: DATES AND TOPICS
-----------------------
7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that, XXXXXXXXXXXX he would ask to meet with NSC’s Michael Froman in Washington and was considering requesting an appropriate meeting with the Treasury Department. The topics would include the dates of the next G-20 meeting, as well as the agenda.
8. (C) In the first two G-20 Financial Summits, U.S. and Chinese positions had been close, closer even than the United States and Europe, XXXXXXXXXXXX noted. Views on major issues such as the need for fiscal stimulus and reform of international financial institutions were similar. Leading up to the London Summit, XXXXXXXXXXXX felt that the U.S.-U.K.-China “troika” had been effective: Beijing could persuade the developing countries, Washington could influence Japan and South Korea, and London could bring along the Europeans.
9. (C) The first two G-20 summits, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX had succeeded in boosting confidence and agreeing on measures to help international financial institutions cope with the crisis. Now, the G-20 had entered an implementation period. He outlined four objectives that he intended to discuss with Froman:
A) Establish what stimulus and macroeconomic policy coordination the G-20 economies needed to implement to ensure economic recovery;
B) Strengthen the message against protectionism so that leaders did not “break their promises as soon as they returned home”;
C) Set a clear timetable for IMF reform, establishing whether the New Arrangement to Borrow (NAB) decisions had any relation to future quota; and
D) Reforming the international monetary system, vis-a-vis the dollar and an alternative reserve currency such as Special Drawing Rights (SDRs).
10. (C) Expounding on this last topic, XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that a stable U.S. dollar was good for China, and Beijing had no interest in “destabilizing the system.” The system, however, was “not perfect and needs reform.” He said China had a huge stake in how the United States managed the dollar. Further, XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested that the RMB could become a component of the SDR. Mentioning that the RMB could compose two percent of the SDR value, XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that this was more of a symbolic than practical change.
11. (U) Note: XXXXXXXXXXXX’s comments on the Strategic and Economic Dialogue will be reported septel.
VFM HE’S WASHINGTON VISIT: DPRK, IRAN, AF/PAK
---------------------------------------------
BEIJING 00001176 003 OF 005
12. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX reviewed several issues he hoped to discuss during his upcoming visit to Washington, including North Korea, Iran and Afghanistan/Pakistan. On North Korea, XXXXXXXXXXXX hoped to hold “informal consultations” in Washington on how generally to approach the North Koreans, not just through the Six-Party Talks. Washington and Beijing nevertheless needed to discuss how to maintain momentum in the Six-Party Talks so as to preserve our common interest in stability of the Korean Peninsula. North Korea wanted to engage directly with the United States and was therefore acting like a “spoiled child” in order to get the attention of the “adult.” China therefore encouraged the United States, “after some time,” to start to re-engage the DPRK. In this regard, it was good that the New York channel remained open, XXXXXXXXXXXX observed. Noting that Special Representative for North Korea Policy Stephen Bosworth would visit Beijing in May, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that, if the Six-Party Talks would be on hold for an extended period, then the Six Parties needed to find ways to continue to engage the DPRK and each other, either bilaterally or even perhaps trilaterally. The Charge noted that we should be careful not to reinforce Pyongyang’s bad behavior.
13. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX also hoped to discuss the Iranian nuclear issue in Washington. Beijing appreciated the “bold steps” taken by Washington. China had told Tehran that this represented a good opportunity for Iran to resume playing a positive role in the region. Though such an Iranian role made moderate Arab countries “jittery,” XXXXXXXXXXXX said, this should be a matter the United States could “manage.” What was essential was to get Iran involved positively in the region again.
14. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said he also hoped to discuss Afghanistan/Pakistan. The Charge stated that, even though XXXXXXXXXXXX was unable to announce new money for Afghanistan at the April 17 Pakistan Donors’ Conference, China still had an opportunity to contribute to the security and stability of both Afghanistan and Pakistan. One way to do so would be to agree to a re-supply route via China for U.S. forces in Afghanistan. On the re-supply route question, XXXXXXXXXXXX said China would like to see a list of items that would be transported on the proposed route, noting that “non-lethal” is a broad and vague term.
TIBET AND TAIWAN AS “CORE INTERESTS”
------------------------------------
15. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX raised concerns over China’s “core interests” of Tibet and Taiwan, which he said could “derail” bilateral cooperation. On Tibet, China had heard “rumors” that the Dalai Lama would attend a “seminar” in the United States in late September or early October, and that President Obama was “likely” to meet with him then. Noting that there was no need for both sides to reiterate our respective positions on Tibet, XXXXXXXXXXXX said the critical question was whether both sides would agree to “take care” of each other’s “core interests.” When considering such sensitive issues in the context of the bilateral relationship, they could be viewed either as “obstacles” or as “core interests.” It did not matter whether one side “liked or disliked” such matters; rather, in a “mature, close and important” bilateral relationship such as ours, the question was whether the key interests for each side would be accommodated. The United States had its core interests, XXXXXXXXXXXX asserted, such as U.S. naval vessels that had operated near the Chinese coast. Both sides agreed to “step down” over that issue, despite the strongly held views of the Chinese public. Regarding the Dalai Lama, China hoped the United States would deny him a visa, and if not, then agree to hold no official meetings with him, including no meeting with President Obama.
16. (C) The Charge expressed concern with China’s defining Tibet as a “core issue” with the apparent expectation that others would “step back.” Instead, our two sides should agree to continue to discuss the issue in an attempt to resolve our differences. The United States recognized that Tibet is a part of China. Nevertheless, the Dalai Lama is a respected religious leader and Nobel Laureate, and U.S. officials meet with him in that capacity. Future meetings by U.S. officials with the Dalai Lama could not be ruled out. Moreover, there were serious concerns among the U.S. public, the Administration and Congress over the situation in Tibetan areas of China. China should take steps to address Tibetans’ legitimate grievances and engage the Dalai Lama’s representatives in productive dialogue. Denying a visa to the Dalai Lama was not being contemplated.
BEIJING 00001176 004 OF 005
17. (C) Another issue that could “derail” relations was arms sales to Taiwan, XXXXXXXXXXXX said. China had long opposed U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, especially advanced weapons sales. China was concerned by reports of possible “very important” and “potent” arms sales to Taiwan, including 60 Blackhawk helicopters and F-16 C/D fighter aircraft. Such arms sales were a “very serious issue” for China, XXXXXXXXXXXX said. The Charge replied that there had been no change to our one China policy based on the three joint communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). In accordance with the TRA, the United States made available to Taiwan defense articles that allowed Taiwan to maintain a credible defense. The Charge urged China to take steps to reduce military deployments aimed at Taiwan.
HUMAN RIGHTS: LIU XIAOBO, GAO ZHISHENG
---------------------------------------
18. (C) The Charge raised two human rights cases, inquiring as to the status, location and treatment of dissident writer and Charter 08 signatory Liu Xiaobo and rights lawyer Gao Zhisheng. XXXXXXXXXXXX replied that, as a sign of the “maturity” of our bilateral relationship, he had “repeatedly” listened to our concerns regarding these two cases. Both cases would be handled “according to law” and in accordance with China’s legal/judicial system. Such cases were “sensitive” and should be handled “carefully,” XXXXXXXXXXXX said, pledging that he nevertheless would look into the cases “to the extent possible.”
NORTH KOREAN “GUESTS”
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19. (S) The Charge emphasized the importance of expediting exit procedures from China for two North Koreans who had entered the Embassy compound and asked for XXXXXXXXXXXX’s assistance in doing so. XXXXXXXXXXXX said he would look into the matter.
U.S. JOURNALISTS DETAINED IN DPRK
---------------------------------
20. (C) The Charge urged China to press the DPRK to release the two American journalists detained in North Korea. XXXXXXXXXXXX replied that the United States could “rest assured” that China would do so.
UNSC REFORM
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21. (C) China was concerned by “momentum” that was building on UN Security Council reform, which was “not good” for the P-5, XXXXXXXXXXXX said. China wanted the United States to maintain its position on UNSC reform and not be “proactive” on the matter, which the PRC feared could result in a UN General Assembly resolution on the subject. The P-5 “club” should not be “diluted,” XXXXXXXXXXXX said. If we end up with a “P-10,” both China and the United States would “be in trouble.” Moreover, it would be difficult for the Chinese public to accept Japan as a permanent member of the UNSC. The Charge replied that the Administration had not completed its policy review on UNSC expansion, so we do not yet have a position on specific proposals. Nonetheless, the United States believed that UN members should be allowed to state their positions freely and openly without undue P-5 influence. Regarding Japan, the Charge said that, while no decision had been made about which countries to support for permanent membership on the UNSC, it was hard to envision any expansion of the Council that did not include Japan, which was the second-largest contributor to the UN budget.
COCA II: AVOIDING A “TRADE WAR”
--------------------------------
22. (C) The Charge expressed concern that differences regarding a Conditions of Construction Agreement (COCA) II for our new Consulate General in Guangzhou had begun to leak into other areas. The Charge asked XXXXXXXXXXXX to speak with the appropriate PRC officials to stop this trend before significant damage was done. The COCA II team from Washington held good discussions in Beijing last week with MFA DG for Administrative Affairs Li Chao regarding the new CG Guangzhou complex. The U.S. Embassy today had formally invited DG Li to Washington in May for further talks. One serious problem, the Charge noted, was the Chinese having moved to block new housing leases for the U.S. Embassy in
BEIJING 00001176 005 OF 005
Beijing in an apparent attempt to gain leverage on office properties. XXXXXXXXXXXX said this situation sounded like a “trade war.” The Charge asked XXXXXXXXXXXX to help stop this matter before it led to a downward cycle. XXXXXXXXXXXX said he believed real progress had been made and differences narrowed during the most recent round of COCA II talks and that China did not want a “trade war” over COCA II issues. He pledged to “look into” the matter.
PICCUTA
11. Viewing cable 09SEOUL672, MND: DPRK MILITARY RHETORIC AND NATIONAL DEFENSE
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin 09SEOUL672 2009-04-27 06:06 2010-11-29 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Seoul VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHUL #0672/01 1170635
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 270635Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4147
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 5773
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1316
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 9637
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 5865
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR PRIORITY 1817
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG PRIORITY 4294
RUACAAA/COMUSKOREA INTEL SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSFK SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITYC O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000672
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2019
TAGS: PGOV KN KS
SUBJECT: MND: DPRK MILITARY RHETORIC AND NATIONAL DEFENSE
COMMISSION CHANGES ARE ABOUT SUCCESSION
Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4(b/d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: The DPRK's recent restaffing and expansion of the National Defense Commission (NDC) and its hostile military rhetoric over the last several months are related to the DPRK leadership's "top priority" need to stabilize the DPRK internally in preparation for succession, according to XXXXXXXXXXX A second priority was to achieve improved Relations with the United States, which the DPRK regards as its only potential security guarantor, ironically. END SUMMARY.
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Military Statements and the NDC
-------------------------------
2. (C) In an April 23 meeting, XXXXXXXXXXXX told Poloff that the Korean People's Army's (KPA) spate of high-level announcements over the past several months (such as the March 8 KPA Supreme Command report, the first in 15 years, and the four KPA General Staff statements since January, not seen since 1999) should not be misinterpreted as the DPRK military asserting control over the country, because the military could act only in concert with the Worker's Party and the Cabinet. Instead the "generals appearing on TV" was a phenomenon directed at DPRK citizens with two goals: to show that the DPRK's hostile external situation meant citizens had to pull together, and as a "power display" to send a law-and-order message to counter the increasing economic disorder resulting from decades of economic "depression." There was dissatisfaction among some elite groups in the DPRK, who knew of economic reform in China and Vietnam and wondered why the DPRK had instead deteriorated. To tamp down this internal dissent, external tension was needed. The ROKG was not particularly worried about the specific threats to the South contained in the statements because they saw the statements as targeted at the domestic audience, and in any case knew the DPRK would try to achieve surprise if it were to resort to military action, rather than giving warning.
3. (C) The key factor in the background was 67-year-old Kim Jong-il's (KJI) waning health. After KJI's August 2008 stroke, the DPRK was a "different environment that needed stronger leadership." XXXXXXXXXXXX said that before the stroke, KJI was confident that he could rule for years, but afterward he suffered "physical and psychological trauma." KJI had become obsessed with creating political stability to allow an orderly succession, though XXXXXXXXXXXX did not claim to know who was next in line. Immediately after the April 5 missile launch the Supreme People's Assembly had declared the beginning of KIM's third ruling period. But rather than celebrating the renewal of his mandate, KJI was concentrating on changes that would pave the way for succession.
4. (C) The most important of these was the enlargement (from 8 to 13 members) and strengthening of the KJI-chaired National Defense Commission (NDC). The NDC was first established in 1998 with a largely symbolic role, but had since taken on policy and coordination functions. Now it had the lead on succession, XXXXXXXXXXXX believed. KJI brother-in-law Chang Song-taek's addition to the NDC was important for succession preparation, not only because he was married to KJI's only sibling and close confidante 63-year-old Kim Kyong-hui, but also because Chang was seen as having effectively protected and acted for KJI during KJI's fall 2008 recovery period.
5. (C) Another key change was the replacement of National Defense Commission Deputy Chairman Kim Yong-chun with Oh Kuk-ryul, a 78-year old Kim-family loyalist (in relative terms, since all senior officials are loyalists) who XXXXXXXXXXXX thought was consolidating various ROK-surveillance and special operations institutions under his control at NDC. One of these was the Worker's Party's Operations Department, which Oh has headed since 1989. (XXXXXXXXXXXX also referred to an April 21 JoongAng Ilbo newspaper article claiming that "Office 35," charged with intel collection, and the "External Liaison Office," charged with training agents, had both been moved from the Operations Department to NDC/KPA control, saying that ROK intel sources did not think there was evidence of such a move.) The Operations Department, which formulates actions against the South, was "passive" during the 1999-2007 Sunshine Policy period, but was now becoming more active again. In other words, Oh's job was to keep the South off balance and make sure that it did not disrupt the succession period. XXXXXXXXXXXX said he believed that changes to the DPRK constitution, announced but not yet explained, would also focus on succession-related issues. He alluded to frequent DPRK propaganda aiming for the stablishment of a "strong and prosperous" nation by 2012, saying that DPRK authorities believed they had already succeeded ideologically and militarily, so they were concentrating on the economic side, which is where the Kaesong Industrial Complex fit in.
6. (C) The DPRK's determination to maintain internal order meant that it could go so far as to engage in "limited armed conflict" with the ROK. At the same time, the DPRK was well aware that ROK forces were ready for any provocation and would respond with superior force. In addition, the DPRK knew that combined ROK-U.S. surveillance capabilities would prevent it from achieving surprise, so XXXXXXXXXXX was reassured that no direct military provocation was imminent.
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Relations with the U.S.
-----------------------
7. (C) Asked what the ROKG's policy options were, given the above situation, XXXXXXXXXXXX answered indirectly, saying that the main question was U.S.-DPRK relations. Second only to maintaining internal stability to allow for succession was the DPRK's determination to improve relations with the U.S., because only the U.S. could solve both the DPRK's security and economic problems. XXXXXXXXXXXX said this push for improved relations was ironic, given DPRK rhetoric attacking the U.S. as a menace, but was nevertheless high on DPRK authorities' agenda. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the DPRK saw the 1999-2000 rapprochement with the Clinton Administration as the first, failed, chance for peace with the U.S.; that the Bush (43) Administration had turned to negotiations too late for substantial progress; and that the Obama Administration amounted to a "second chance." The DPRK craved a dialogue with the U.S., aiming for a "big deal," but first needed to raise tensions to create the need for dialogue.
8. (C) The scope for inter-Korean relations depended on what happened with U.S.-DPRK relations. XXXXXXXXXXXX was convinced that the DPRK would keep tension high towards the South, while seeking an opening with the U.S. Therefore, his recommendation to ROK policymakers was to stay on an even keel to keep the South-North situation from deteriorating further. The DPRK's April 21 proposal for dialogue about land-use and wages at the Kaesong Industrial Complex was potentially helpful in that regard, but had to be approached carefully, because the DPRK would try to seize the initiative and lock-in economic benefits without offering reciprocal steps. Like other ROKG officials, XXXXXXXXXXXX emphasized the need for continued close U.S.-ROK coordination on all issues related to North Korea.
9. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX cautioned that China would seek to prevent U.S.-DPRK relations from improving too much, adding with a smile that had it not been for its attitude toward the U.S., China would have moved to prevent the October 2006 DPRK
nuclear weapon test.
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Mt. Kumgang
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10. (C) As an aside, XXXXXXXXXXXX commented on the July 2008 shooting death of a South Korean tourist at Mt. Kumgang. He said that KPA soldiers and sentries in the area, after frequent contact with South Korean tourists, had a tendency to be too relaxed, so KPA officers periodically conducted exercises to tighten discipline. The shooting had occurred during one of those exercise periods.
STEPHENS
12. Viewing cable 09SEOUL59, ROK’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE NEIGHBORS: NORTH
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09SEOUL59 2009-01-12 09:09 2010-11-29 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Seoul
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHUL #0059/01 0120912
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 120912Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2890
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 5157
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 9172
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 5263
RUACAAA/COMUSKOREA INTEL SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSFK SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY Monday, 12 January 2009, 09:12
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000059
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/12/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, KS, KN
SUBJECT: ROK’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE NEIGHBORS: NORTH
KOREA, JAPAN, CHINA AND RUSSIA
REF: A. TOKYO 3114 (TRILATERAL POLICY PLANNING) B. SECDEF DTG261447ZNOV08 (DEFENSE TRILATERAL TALKS) C. TOKYO 3416 (ROK-PRC-JAPAN TRILATS) D. SEOUL 1681 (ROKG ON CHINA) E. SEOUL 1700 (ROK-PRC SUMMIT) F. SEOUL 2461 (ROK-RUSSIA STRATEGIC DIALOGUE)
Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4(b/d)
1. (C) Summary: As a presidential candidate, Lee Myoung-bak called for a “creative reconstruction” of Korea’s foreign policy. In his February 2008 inaugural address, Lee criticized his two predecessors, saying, “At times over the last ten years, we found ourselves faltering and confused.” He vowed to trade ideology for pragmatism as Korea’s surest means of improving ties with its neighbors, and he’s had some successes, especially with China and Russia, where Lee was able to expand substantially economic and political ties. Lee’s efforts on Japan and North Korea are more mixed. With Japan, the South Korean public was not quite ready to accept fully Lee’s attempts to compartmentalize history issues. Still, much progress was made in Seoul-Tokyo consultations on a variety of issues ranging from North Korea to economic to even security issues. On North Korea, Lee’s conservative agenda was predictably rebuffed by Pyongyang. However, all signs are that President Lee is quite comfortable in sticking to denuclearization and reciprocity as the basis of his North Korea policy, especially as it enjoys considerable support. End Summary.
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DPRK
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2. (C) In a February 2007 speech that has widely come to be known as the “MB Doctrine,” presidential candidate Lee Myung-bank firmed up his vision of his administration’s North Korea Policy. Lee said his first priority would be to abolish what he described as his predecessors’ “unprincipled and unilateral policy of appeasement” toward the DPRK and replace it with a policy that offered generous assistance in exchange for North Korea’s complete nuclear dismantlement and Pyongyang’s accommodation of South Korea’s desire for family reunion, accounting of welfare and whereabouts of POWs from the Korean War and several hundred abductees after the war. Immediately upon taking office, the Lee Administration also made it clear that it would review all commitments from the two South-North summits -- June 2000 and October 2007. Senior Lee Administration officials complained publicly that the October 2007 summit between Kim Jong-il and President Roh Moo-hyun was arranged by Roh to favor the progressive candidate in the presidential election two months later and that therefore President Lee was not bound to fulfill promises amounting to billions of dollars of aid to the North.
3. (C) The response from Pyongyang was predictably swift and severe. Using threatening language not heard since the Kim Young-sam days, North Korea has moved step by step to cut off inter-Korean relations. Initially, all inter-Korean meetings were cancelled, with the North loudly proclaiming that food aid from the South was neither needed nor wanted. Thereafter, Pyongyang implemented a draconian restriction in December of North-South cross-border traffic, stopping Kaesong tourism and severely limiting traffic to the Kaesong Industrial Complex. As the Kumgang tourism had been stopped by the South over the July shooting death of a Southern tourist, the net result has been a crippling blow to the KIC and Kumgang tourism, the two proudest results of the Sunshine policy.
4. (C) With both sides dug in, the outlook for any quick improvement in inter-Korean relations is slim to none. Much more likely is the continued “psychological war,” as characterized by Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan in his recent meeting with the Ambassador. President Lee is determined not to give in to North Korean pressure. Our Blue House contacts have told us on several occasions that President Lee remained quite comfortable with his North Korea policy and that he is prepared leave the inter-Korean relations frozen until the end of his term in office, if necessary. It is also our assessment that Lee’s more conservative advisors and supporters see the current standoff as a genuine opportunity to push and further weaken the North, even if this might involve considerable brinkmanship. Also favoring the Lee Administration’s stance is the the Korean public, which is calm to the point of apathy about the inter-Korean situation.
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Japan
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5. (C) President Lee has made concerted efforts to improve relations with Tokyo, which were significantly strained during the Roh Moo-hyun era over history and territory issues. Lee sought to compartmentalize what he called “disputes over the past”, stating in an early policy address that “South Korea and Japan should...try to foster a future-oriented relationship with a pragmatic attitude. Historical truth must not be ignored, but we can no longer afford to give up our future relations due to disputes over the past.” Lee’s vision was to look beyond the history-bound bilateral issues and create a Korea-Japan partnership active in the regional and global arena on issues like the denuclearization of the DPRK, strengthening of multilateral relationships, trade and economics, and cooperation on projects like alternative energy, communicable diseases, and poverty alleviation.
6. (C) So far, Lee’s efforts have yielded some success, although Blue House officials would argue that results would have been far better had Tokyo shown more courage, especially in dealing with the Takeshima/Dokdo issue. For example, Lee pressed ahead with his plan to engage Japan on a more strategic regional and global level. Lee made the decision that Korea would participate in the October U.S.-Japan-Korea Trilateral Policy Planning talks (Ref A) in Tokyo. He then agreed to the U.S.-Japan-Korea Defense Trilateral Talks (Ref B) in Washington in November, the first trilateral defense talks in six years. Lee also initiated the first ever stand-alone China-Japan-Korea Trilateral Summit (Ref C) in Fukuoka in December. Critics will of course point out that there were no substantive results from these meetings, but the fact that the meetings were held at all is a significant result.
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China
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7. (C) President Lee has openly courted the Chinese, and he has chalked up some noteworthy successes. Less than one year into his term, Lee has already met with PRC President Hu Jintao three times, quite unprecedented in the history of ROK-PRC relations (Ref D); typically, in the past, the ROK could expect only one visit in a PRC president’s ten-year term. Lee paid his first state visit to Beijing in May 2008 and met Hu again in August when Lee traveled to Beijing for the Olympics. Hu paid a state visit to Seoul August 25-26. President Lee made the relations seem a two-way desire. A Chinese Embassy contact told us that Beijing had been concerned that China-Korea relations would suffer because of the emphasis Lee wanted to put on improving U.S.-Korea relations. Therefore, China was pleasantly surprised that Lee was able to improve both bilateral relationships simultaneously. Kim Heung-kyu, Professor of Chinese Security and Foreign Policy at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, said Lee had effectively leveraged the U.S.-Korea relationship to improve relations with China, which is eager for closer ties with Korea to check U.S. and Japanese interests in the region.
8. (C) During Lee’s first visit to Beijing, he and Hu issued a joint statement which upgraded the Korea-China relationship to a “strategic cooperative partnership”. Our Chinese Embassy contact gave the clearest explanation of what was now “strategic” about the ROK-PRC relationship: that China’s nomenclature to describe its relations with Korea was upgraded according to a roughly five-year schedule. In 1992, relations were normalized; in 1998, the first year of Kim Dae-jung’s term as President, the Chinese upgraded the relationship to “cooperative partnership”; in 2002, it was upgraded again to “comprehensive cooperative partnership,” and now it is “strategic cooperative partnership.”
9. (C) Despite the name, Koreans have found substantive strategic discussions with the Chinese frustratingly difficult. For example, Lee, unlike his immediate predecessors, Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, added North Korean human rights to the Korea-China summit agenda in August, asking Hu not to repatriate North Korean refugees against their will. Hu did not respond to Lee’s request (Ref E). Also, we understand, Lee asked Hu what China thought about the North Korean domestic political situation and whether Beijing had any contingency plans. This time, Hu apparently pretended not to hear Lee. Still, the ROK did not come away empty, because, despite initial Chinese objections, Lee was successful in including in the summit joint statement a commitment “to promote dialogue and cooperation in the field of international human rights.”
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Russia
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10. (C) Lee has largely continued the trend of his predecessors in upgrading economic ties with Russia. ROK-Russia economic ties have grown more than 40% annually for the past three years, with two-way trade exceeding USD 15 billion in 2007. Much of the growth is due to Russia’s natural resources. For example, Lee paid a state visit to Moscow in September and agreed to a contract for Russia to supply Korea with 7.5 million tons of natural gas annually for thirty years beginning from 2015, amounting to an estimated 20% of Korea’s annual natural gas consumption. And despite doubts about North Korea’s cooperation, Lee agreed in principle to Russia exploring plans for a pipeline through North Korea to deliver the gas. The two countries also agreed to investigate the possibilities for linking the inter-Korean railway to the trans-Siberian railway system (Ref F).
11. (C) On his state visit, Lee also signed an agreement to upgrade the ROK-Russia relationship to a “Strategic Cooperative Partnership”, the same term used by China to describe this year’s upgrade to the ROK-PRC relationship. Ko Jae-nam, of MOFAT’s Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, said Korea proposed using the term “Strategic Cooperative Partnership” after China used the term to describe the ROK-PRC relationship. Ko said Korea’s objective in using the same terminology to describe the ROK-Russia relationship was to balance the ROK-PRC relationship.
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Comment
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12. (C) During a year in which President Lee faced considerable difficulty advancing his domestic agenda, his foreign policy efforts, if not wildly successful, at least did not get him into trouble. To a considerable degree, relations with South Korea’s neighbors are driven by economic realities -- increased regional trade, investment, and tourism -- that mesh with Lee’s pragmatic, non-ideological approach. Relations with North Korea were the outlier, as the DPRK took pains in 2008 to demonstrate that it could live without ROK assistance. STEPHENS
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ilhostyle@sisain.co.kr
